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Gerhardt: A Modest Decision

A MODEST DECISION

Michael J. Gerhardt*
INTRODUCTION

Ever since the confirmation hearings for John Roberts' nomination as Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, commentators have been obsessed with his avowed
preference for judges to be modest.' His opinions, as well as those of the Supreme Court
that bears his name, have been routinely scoured for indicia of their modesty or
immodesty. Presumably, the focus of this Symposium on the assertiveness of the Roberts
Court is aimed at illuminating the extent to which the Court has embraced a bolder, less
modest approach to deciding cases.
Assertiveness is in some tension with modesty. Assertiveness is commonly
understood to be a disposition to make "bold or confident" declarations.2 Modesty is
usually understood to be something quite different, an expression or exhibition of
shyness, reticence, or humility. 3 An assertive Court might be immodest; modesty is,
technically speaking, not the direct opposite. Assertiveness and modesty are not
necessarily concerned with truth or validity; however, in the right context, either could
be a description or aspect of a particular outcome. Modesty might seem to be more in
accordance with the notion of judicial restraint in the sense that this notion suggests a
disinclination to reach beyond the facts or the law, which is more likely to occur with an
attitude of assertiveness, especially to the extent that it lacks or is indifferent to proof.
Nonetheless, modesty and assertiveness are each not necessarily about the correctness of
the outcome, but rather the style, or a perceived style, of judicial decision-making. Even
if modesty were understood to mean not doing more than what was necessary to decide a
case or not to overreach, we still need to have a technique or means by which we know
what was necessary or required for deciding a particular case. Neither modesty nor
assertiveness necessarily points to the correct answer. Each could be unprincipled or
mistaken, particularly if it were bending over backwards to uphold a constitutionally
dubious (or defenseless) federal or state action. The focus on style might mask or
obscure whether the Court actually reached the right decision or result in a particular
* Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor in Constitutional Law & Director, Center for Law and
Government, University of North Carolina.
1. Michael J. Gerhardt, ConstitutionalHumility, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 23, 23 (2007). See, e.g., Stuart Taylor,
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http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/03/in-praise-of-judicial-modesty/476 /.
2. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assertive (defining
"assertiveness" as "disposed to . .. bold or confident statements.").
3. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modesty (defining
"modesty" as "freedom from conceit or vanity").
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case. It would be a focus that places form over substance, if we are not careful.
Perhaps no recent decision of the Roberts Court better illustrates the costs and
benefits of a focus on the style of a decision - on its assertiveness or modesty - than
United States v. Comstock,4 in which the Supreme Court described its efforts twice
therein as "modest." 5 Any Supreme Court decision that characterizes itself as "modest"
is asking for trouble, because modesty usually does not call attention to itself. In this
case, the justices' opinions are not nearly as modest as they have supposed (or perhaps as
boldly assertive as critics might maintain). It is possible that many people might have
hoped that the case would turn out to be the first in a series to narrow the Court's
construction of the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause. 6 Yet the Court did just
the opposite, construing the Necessary and Proper Clause more broadly than it ever has
before. The decision was all the more remarkable because of the vote; it was a 7-2
decision, and the opinions in the case tell us a lot about where the justices currently stand
on not only the Necessary and Proper Clause but also the Commerce Clause.
Consequently, the Court's decision, and the path by which it got there, has serious
ramifications for its decisions in other contexts, including the constitutionality of the
individual mandate provision in the health care bill. 7
My comments on Comstock are set forth in four parts. In part I, I briefly sketch the
opinion. In part 1I, I briefly sketch the indicia of a modest opinion and examine how each
of the opinions fit these criteria. In part III, I consider the ways in which the justices'
opinions were immodest or brazenly assertive. In the final part, I suggest how a modest,
less assertive opinion might have looked.
I.
The issue in Comstock can be easily stated, and was regarded as perfectly
straightforward by the majority. The question before the Court was whether it was
constitutional for a federal statute to authorize a federal district court, pursuant to a
request from the Department of Justice, to detain "a mentally ill, sexually dangerous
federal prisoner beyond the date he would otherwise be released." 8 The majority
4. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (20 10).
5. See infra note 11 and accompanying text at 1958, 1961.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
7. President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act into law on March 23,
2010. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Many critics of
the law call it, ObamaCare. See Editorial, EmbracingHis Inner 'Obamacare',N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at
Al8. President Obama, however, has also indirectly embraced the term, "Obamacare," in order to foster
support for the law. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted one writ of certiorari to the state of Florida to
challenge the law in November 2011 and will hear oral arguments on the constitutionality of at least the
individual mandate provision in March 2012, with a decision to be made by late June 2012. Adam Liptak,
Justices to Hear Healthcare Cases As Race Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at Al. Additionally, the
case's oral arguments will be five and a half hours long - which could be a record. Andrew Cristy,
'Obamacare' Will Rank Among the Longest Oral Arguments Ever, NPR: IT'S ALL POLITICS BLOG, (Nov. 15,
2011, 5:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/11/15/142363047/obamacare-will-rank-amongthe-longest-supreme-court-arguments-ever. The challenges to the individual mandate currently before the
Supreme Court are as follows: Seven-Sky v. Holder, _
F.3d
(D.C. Cir. 2011), petitionfor cert. filed,
(U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679); Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (1Ith
Cir. 2011), cert. granted,(U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400); Liberty University v. Geithner, _ F.3d.
(4th Cir. 201 1),petitionfor cert.filed,(U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438).
8. Comstock, 130S. Ct. at 1951.
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9
concluded that it was constitutional, based on "five considerations, taken together." In
particular, the Court found that the statute "constitutes a means that is rationally related
to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power," 10 that the statute was "a
modest addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed
for many decades,""l that the statute properly accommodated the States' interests in
protecting its populace from sexually dangerous people,12 and that the statute was
"narrow in scope." 13
Justices Kennedy and Alito each wrote separately and concurred only in the
Court's judgment. Justice Kennedy rejected the majority's application of its "rational
basis" test derived from its economic due process cases as "one of the most deferential
formulations of the standard for reviewing legislation in all of the Court's precedents."l 4
Instead, he insisted that:

[U]nder the Necessary and Proper Clause, application of a 'rational basis' test should be at
least as exacting as it has been in the Commerce Clause cases if not more so. . . . The
rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a demonstrated link in fact,
based on empirical demonstration [of the regulated activity's substantial affect on interstate
commerce].
He explained further that the law at issue in the case "is a discrete and narrow exercise of
authority over a small class of persons already subject to the federal power."l 6 Similarly,
Justice Alito expressed concerns about "the breadth of the Court's language." 1 7 He
suggested that the Necessary and Proper Clause did "not give Congress carte blanche" in
this case but rather that there must be "an 'appropriate' link between a power conferred
by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress."1 8 He concluded that, "[h]ere,
there is a substantial link to Congress' constitutional powers" "to provide for the civil
commitment of dangerous federal prisoners who otherwise escape civil commitment as a
result of federal imprisonment."' 9
In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined in all but one section of Justice Scalia, read the
Court's Necessary and Proper Clause more narrowly and its jurisprudence as much more
9. Id. at 1956.
10. Id. at 1956.
11. Id. at 1958. A few pages later, the Court reiterated that the challenged statute "is a modest addition to a
longstanding federal statutory framework, which has been in place since 1855." Id at 1961.
12. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1961.
13. Id. at 1964. In acknowledging the fifth consideration, the Court accepted then-Solicitor General Elena
Kagan's assurances that the statute's
reach is limited to individuals already 'in the custody of the' Federal Government . . . . Indeed, the
Solicitor General argues that 'the Federal Government would not have . . . the power to commit a
person who . . . has been released from prison and whose period of supervised release is also
completed.' Thus, far from a 'general police power,' [the law] is a reasonably adapted and narrowly
tailored means of pursuing the Government's legitimate interest as a federal custodian in the
responsible administration of its prison system.
Id. at 1964-65 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
15. Id.
16. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968.
17. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 1970 (citation omitted).
19. Id.
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restrictive than the majority. For him, the Clause required that a law's means must have
some connection to its ends but that its ends must satisfy the "limitation" of being "
'legitimate.' "20 He noted that Congress, in enacting this law, had not specified any
"enumerated power or powers as a constitutional predicate[,] ... and none are readily
discernible."21 Justice Scalia did not join his further suggestion that in order for a law to
be "legitimate" it must be because it has some "connection to an enumerated power"
rather than "simply because it furthers other laws Congress has enacted in the exercise of
its incidental authority . . . ."22
II.
A judicial opinion is likely to qualify as "modest" if it does some or all of five
things. First, it should not decide more than it has to in order to resolve the case before
the Court. A modest opinion does not reach too far or decide too much. Second, a modest
opinion exhibits restraint by grounding itself in a legitimate or proper source of legal
authority outside of, or apart from, the justices' personal or political preferences. A
modest judicial opinion hews as closely as possible to authoritative sources, such as
precedent or original meaning. Third, a modest judicial opinion acknowledges its
possible limits or weaknesses. Such acknowledgment includes explaining or clarifying
ways in which the court extends or deviates from legitimate sources of decision such as
precedent. Fourth, a modest judicial opinion exhibits respect for contrary views. A
modest judicial opinion is respectful of dissent and disagreement. Last, but not least, a
judicial decision might be modest if its results or its consequences are relatively
inconsequential. The change that it produces in the status quo is relatively minor.
The majority opinion in Comstock is modest in each of these ways. First, the
majority seems to take pains to narrow the scope of its decision. It leaves the question of
due process (conceivably a big one in this case) for another day, and it only reaches the
ex post facto question because it seems to have had no choice. The opinion is framed to
underscore its limited reaches, and emphasizes, more than once, that its scope is
deliberately "narrow." 23
Second, the majority opinion acknowledges its limitations. It dutifully
acknowledges that the question it considers is not straightforwardly or definitively
answered by the case law as it stands. So, it needs to make a "modest" extension, or
adaptation to, the Court's doctrine.
Third, the majority's tone is respectful of the Court's precedents and relevant
historical practices. The majority examines in detail the historical support for its
decision, both in the longstanding precedent and historical practices of the government.
These are two widely regarded authoritative sources of decision to which the majority
appears to be trying to hew as closely as possible. 24
Fourth, the majority treats the other opinions in the case with respect. It is

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1972 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1973 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1976, 1977.
Id. at 1965 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1956.
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noteworthy that the majority refrains from taking pot shots at the other opinions in the
case or knit-picking those opinions. It gives them space.
Last, the impact of the decision seems "modest," as, indeed, the Court tells us. 25
The Court notes that the statute in question "has been applied to only a small fraction of
federal prisoners" and that "its reach is limited to individuals already 'in the custody of
the' Federal Government."26 The statute is "a reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored
means of pursuing the Government's legitimate interest as a federal custodian in the
responsible administration of its prison system." 27
What may be especially modest about the Court's opinion is the fact that Chief
Justice Roberts joins it without a hint of hesitancy or concern. In fact, his participation in
the case is entirely silent - with the exception of his unqualified vote to join the
majority opinion. It is possible that some people might expect the Chief Justice to be
more skeptical of broad constructions of federal power and perhaps even opposed to a
broad construction of either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause.
Nonetheless, there is no indication of that skepticism or opposition here. He makes good
on his promise to avoid unnecessary concurrences and dissents and to favor consensus as
much as possible on the Court. Though it is unclear what his vote might portend for the
future, he is, at the very least, acting as narrowly as possible, thereby leaving room for
himself, and perhaps the Court, to address any problems with its decisions in appropriate
cases in the future.
The concurring opinions also seem similarly modest. To begin with, they are both
respectful of the majority and the dissent. They make clear in their respective opinions
the need to clarify or sharpen the opinion further, but neither opinion expresses disdain
or anything disrespectful about any of the other opinions in the case. The opinions are
mildly critical of the majority opinion but not offensively so. Second, Justices Kennedy
and Alito ground their respective concurrences in the text and structure of the
Constitution as well as the Court's precedents. Third, Justices Kennedy and Alito do not
go further than either has to; the focus of each opinion is strictly on the constitutionality
of this statutory regime.
Each makes clear both what is at stake and not at issue in this case. Justice Alito,
for example, emphasizes in the very first paragraph of his concurrence that he is
"persuaded, on narrow grounds, that it was 'necessary and proper' for Congress to enact
the statute at issue in this case . .. in order to 'carry into Execution' powers specifically
conferred on Congress by the Constitution." 2 8 Both justices emphasize what "this case"
is not about. Moreover, they emphasize, as Justice Kennedy noted near the end of his
concurrence, that "this is a discrete and narrow exercise of authority over a small class of
persons already subject to the federal power."29 Fifth, they both appear aware of the need
to be more rigorous than the majority in their respective opinions because of the
corresponding need to ensure proper enforcement of the limitations on federal power.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1961.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1953.
Id at 1953.
Id at 1968-69 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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While the tone of the dissent is not as respectful as that of either the majority or
concurrences (as is the case often with dissents), it seems modest in its own way. Perhaps
most importantly, Justice Thomas makes clear that he is grounding his arguments not in
anything personal but rather in a close reading of the Court's precedents. He hews
30
closely to both the Court's seminal opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland on the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the framers' and ratifiers' objective "that the
Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent fount of congressional authority, but
rather 'a caveat that Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the
specifically granted 'foregoing powers' of §8 'and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution.' "31 Justice Thomas does not urge the Court to cast aside any precedents,
but instead tries to demonstrate simply and straightforwardly the fact that, "no
enumerated power in Article I, §8, expressly delegates to Congress the power to enact a
civil-commitment regime for sexually dangerous persons, nor does any other provision
in the Constitution vest Congress or the other branches of the Federal Government with
such a power." 3 2
As for Justice Scalia, he appears, perhaps surprisingly to some people, to be every
bit as modest as the Chief Justice. He silently joins Justice Thomas' dissent and foregoes
any opportunity to castigate any of the other justices - or call for the overruling of any
of the Court's other precedents. He even declines to join the portion of the dissent that
seems to pose the most serious problem for the constitutional status quo, the portion in
which Justice Thomas insists that the only "legitimate" objective for which the Congress
may legislate is to implement one of its enumerated powers. For a justice known for his
bold assertions of law and quickness to take issue with opinions with which he disagrees,
Justice Scalia seems to have assumed an unusually modest posture in this case.
III.
Merely saying something is modest does not, of course, make it so. It is entirely
possible that what claims to be modest, in fact, might not be. Indeed, there are signs of
immodesty in Comstock, for a close reading of each opinion indicates ways in which it
either deviates from the sources on which it relies or goes further than it acknowledges.
First, Justice Breyer's majority opinion is conceivably immodest in several
respects. First, it does not faithfully apply the Court's precedents, but rather extends
them. The fact that it construes the federal law at issue as modestly extending the reach
of federal laws already upheld is of no moment, for the question presented in the case is
whether such an extension is constitutional. Once the Court fails to hew closely to an
authoritative source, such as precedent, it has crossed a line. Here, the line crossed is
actually a modest reading of the Court's precedents. A modest reading of the Court's
precedents would be that they did not reach the question in the case - not whether they
could be easily extended to cover the case in question. Because the precedents are
generally very supportive of (and deferential to) Congress, extending them is not an
insignificant act. In fact, the Court is stretching these precedents more than it has ever
30. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
31. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 1973.
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done before. It is hard to accept this as something merely modest in scope.
Moreover, it is not entirely accurate to think of the Court's deference as merely
modest. It is extreme deference, because it is doing an important part of the Congress's
work for it. Usually, we expect the Congress to specify the constitutional authority from
which its disputed law derives, including its connection to enumerated powers and the
legitimate objectives for which it may legislate. In this case, the Congress left these
matters blank, and the Court goes to extreme lengths to fill in the blanks for the
Congress.
There is another aspect of immodesty to the majority opinion. It has to do with the
ease with which the Court dismisses concerns that the statute might be constitutionally
unfair. It is noteworthy that the statute extending Comstock's detention was enacted
AFTER his criminal conviction. 33 The Court elides any difficulty with the timing of the
law by suggesting that the statute not only has procedural protections but also that the
plaintiff, or others in like circumstances, still might be able to bring due process or other
constitutional claims in a separate suit. This is cold comfort for someone who is already
being detained beyond the length of his criminal sentence on the basis of no misconduct
committed in the interim. A modest decision might not have discounted, or downplayed,
the procedural peculiarities of the case but instead grappled with them more honestly or
convincingly.
Moreover, the fact that the law merely affects "a small fraction of federal
prisoners"34 is, upon closer scrutiny, cause for some concern. These are prisoners who
have had the lengths of their federal detention prolonged as a result of no new or
intervening act of illegality. It is not hard to imagine circumstances in which the Court
would recognize a constitutional violation, in spite of the small set of people affected. A
federal law, for instance, criminalizing flag desecration was likely to affect only a few
people but the Court did not hesitate to strike it down. 35 If a constitutional boundary is
exceeded or a constitutional right is involved, the numbers of people disadvantaged can,
or perhaps ought to, be largely irrelevant.
The Court's response to this criticism would no doubt be to emphasize that in
Comstock it was balancing competing considerations. Hence, the size of the
disadvantaged class was weighed or balanced against the magnitude of the federal
interests, which were both to protect the public and to ensure proper administration of its
prison system. It is possible that the outcome might have been different had the size of
the disadvantaged class been larger.
It is also possible a change in this factor might not have affected the outcome,
since it was one of five being weighed by the Court. Put differently, a possible problem
with the decision is that it is unclear whether some factors were each counted the same or
whether some factors mattered more or less than others, and whether the balancing in
this opinion undercuts its value or utility as a precedent. It does not provide much
guidance to lower courts, if any, of the factors on which the Court depended. The

33. See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 276, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1949
(2010).
34. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1953.
35. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
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balancing in this case was clearly driven in part by practical considerations, though the
further suggestion that the opinion merely modestly expanded the Court's precedent was
conclusory, since the Court did not explain its criteria for determining or measuring
modest expansions in the law.
There are immodest aspects to the concurring opinions, too. First, they both are
effectively rewriting the Court's opinions. While Justices Kennedy and Alito are trying
to hew closely to their own prior opinions on the Necessary and Proper and Commerce
Clauses, the majority is probably correct about the appropriate standard to use in the case
based on precedent. The fact is that the Court's precedents in these realms have long
accorded tremendous deference to Congress; it is immodest to suggest otherwise.
Justices Kennedy and Alito each believe the standard should be stricter, though each is
reluctant to make clear that this is itself an extension of the Court's precedents.
Moreover, neither of the concurrences expresses concerns at all about possible
constitutional problems with the law arising from provisions other than the Necessary
and Proper or Commerce Clause. The concurrences leave the same impression as the
majority: that this case came out as it did in large part because a disadvantaged class federal prisoners adjudicated to be sexually dangerous - are among the most unpopular
and politically powerless in American law. There is every reason to believe these
prisoners should be punished to the fullest extent of the law, but the key words there are
"of the law."
Of course, similar problems apply to the dissent. While Justice Thomas maintained
that his position was more faithful to the Court's earlier opinions, structure, and original
meaning than the majority opinion, this was merely an assertion. In fact, he, too, has
effectively rewritten McCulloch, as reflected in Justice Scalia's refusal to join his
characterization of the case as holding that the legitimacy of a federal law depends on
whether the law can be traced to or derived from an enumerated power. The Court does
not say that in McCulloch, and it has never previously held this.
In addition, Justice Thomas fails to give the credit that is due to Congress. While
the majority can be faulted for overlooking the flaws in the statutory scheme, the dissent
can be faulted for its excessive formalism, and for not acknowledging it as such. It is not
hard to see how this law relates to the enumerated powers of Congress, or to the
objectives or ends for which the Congress may legislate. Justice Thomas suggests that
Congress has no power at all to address sexually violent persons, though there are federal
laws - and judicial precedents upholding them - that say the contrary, such as the
Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the Mann Act. 36
Perhaps most importantly, the problem with the dissent is that it made the same
mistake it claimed the majority had made. Justice Thomas suggested that the majority
was effectively giving Congress "carte blanche" in exercising its authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. However, the dissent itself exercises judicial review "carte
blanche." Consistent with his overall approach to judicial decision-making, Justice
Thomas presumes that as a justice he owes no deference at all to the Congress and that
there are, in effect, no bounds on his review of the constitutionality of its handiwork.

36. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 309 (1913).
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There was a legitimate objective, or two, that could be found had Justice Thomas wanted
to find one. To insist that the legitimacy of a law is restricted to the enumerated powers
set forth in Article I flies in the face of the Court's recognition in McCulloch that the
federal government actually has implied powers. Moreover, such insistence, coupled
with the further insistence that the Congress spell out this connection in the law itself is a
new requirement, one that is a bold departure from judicial precedent and historical
practices, and hard, if not impossible, to square with genuine judicial modesty.

IV.
The immodesty of each of the opinions in Comstock could easily have been
avoided. Each could have done more to acknowledge the limits of federal power,
including their own, and of the sources on which they relied.
To begin with, there are four ways in which the majority opinion could have been
more modest. First, rather than minimize the burdens imposed by the federal law, it
could have dealt more openly with their actual magnitude. The Court's estimation that
there would not be many people affected by the law does not diminish the problems
associated with those individuals' indefinite confinement after the end of their respective
criminal sentences. At the very least, the Court could have considered or acknowledged
the ways in which the people subject to detention could ameliorate their further loss of
liberty.
Second, the majority could have done more to explain the legitimacy of the
government's objective in enacting this law. The law does not specify the source of its
constitutional authorization, but the majority could have done so. The majority also
could also have explained why Congress was not obliged, as a matter of constitutional
law, to indicate the specific constitutional authority from which the challenged law arose.
Third, the majority could have explained the basis for its extension of precedent. It
seems that the principal basis for the Court's decision was not precedent itself, but
practical considerations. It should have explained the legitimacy of taking these practical
considerations into account.
Fourth, the majority could have explained the actual limits of federal power in this
context. Justice Breyer's opinion is reminiscent of his dissent in United States v. Lopez,3 7
in which it appeared that he did not believe there was any practical limit to the scope of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. But this law is hard if not impossible
to square with the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence since, inter alia, the regulated
activity is not economic. Thus it is like the activities over which the Court in both Lopez
and United States v. Morrison38 had refused to extend federal jurisdiction. In other
words, the possible problem with the law was that the underlying activity being regulated
was non-economic and thus conceivably not properly regulable under the Commerce
Clause. 39 If the law cannot be justified under the Commerce Clause, no other source of
37.

514 U.S. 549, 615-31 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

38. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
39. A few commentators have emphasized this deficiency, among others, as a problem with the federal law.
See Miles Coleman, Unwanted Advances: Civil Commitment and Congress's Illicit Use of the Commerce
Clause - U.S. v. Comstock, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1217, 1225-26 (2009); Garrick B. Pursley, Penal Deference and
Other Oddities in United States v. Comstock, 6 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 98, 102, 114 (2010); Ilya

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2010

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 46 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 1
388

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46:379

federal authority is readily apparent. Consequently, the power appears to be limitless,
which ought to be impossible for a government of limited powers. If the power has
limits, the majority at the very least ought to have explained them.
While the concurrences did a better job than the majority in explaining the precise
scope of judicial review and corresponding limits of federal power, they, too, could have
been more modest. First, their position is not easily grounded in precedent. They needed
to have clarified in what ways they went beyond precedent and on what authority.
Second, they could have explained how this more exacting standard squares with the
Court's apparently deferential standard of review in McCulloch. Moreover, they could
have specified the actual links between the federal interest and the Congress's
enumerated powers. Lastly, they could have explained more clearly the space separating
them from the dissent, specifically why they accepted, or even whether they accepted,
the law as having a legitimate objective.
The dissent had more to do than either of the other opinions in order to be
considered modest. Indeed, it is not clear at all that the dissent cared about whether the
Court reached a modest decision; it cared about results. Hence, the dissent could have
been more candid about why it took the position that Congress was not entitled to any
deference in this case. It should have explained why the formalism of specifying a
legitimate objective in the law is constitutionally required, and may not be inferred by
the Court. Moreover, it should have clarified both the boundaries of its review and the
irrelevance, in its view, of other, arguably similar federal laws previously upheld by the
Court.
However, what ultimately helps to explain Justice Thomas' dissent is a default rule
that he employs but fails to disclose. For some time, Justice Thomas has maintained,
contrary to several leading precedents, that the Constitution derives its authority from the
States and thus any gaps, ambiguities, or silences in the Constitution should be construed
by the Court to the benefit of the States rather than the federal government. 4 0 Had Justice
Thomas expressly deployed this default rule in this case, he would have been
acknowledging not only an important premise of his reasoning but an important
deviation from precedent. He could have explained, or reiterated, the constitutional
predicate for the application of this default rule in this case.
CONCLUSION

As a measure of judicial performance, modesty is not just about the outcome.
Some people might use modesty to describe the actual reach - or substance - of a
decision, though they might not always be open in disclosing this as their understanding.
It might describe the tone or style of a decision, the extent of its candor or honesty, as
well as the extent to which it adhered to or deviated from an authoritative source of
decision. It also can describe the impact of a decision or its effect on the doctrine or law
of a particular subject.
Whatever the meaning, modesty is in tension with assertiveness, and Comstock
Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of FederalPower, 2010
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 241-42 (2009-10).
40. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848, 857 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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illustrates this tension well. The various opinions assert constructions of sources that are
not as faithful, or "modest," as the justices would like to think. Each of the opinions
leaves out a critical step of reasoning - the majority in its failure to specify the
enumerated power(s) from which the challenged law arose, or whether a link to an
enumerated power was required under the Constitution; the concurrences in their
respective failures to reconcile their standards of review with the Court's precedent and
historical practices, and the dissent in its failure to disclose either the default rule it was
employing or its basis in precedent or historical practices. While the tone of each opinion
seemed reassuring and modest in tone, the ramifications of each opinion were not. Each
of the opinions asserted a basis for judicial review that deviated from the law as it stands
and failed to connect the dots or specify each of the steps it took to reach its desired
outcome, and that kind of deviation is simply not, whatever else it may be, a decision
that can fairly be described as modest.
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